Along with the improvement of financial indicators in recent weeks, it can be said, at least psychologically, as part of the "crisis" of the cycle had passed. But the quick change of the economic situation-which evolves towards the second part of the cycle-a new kind of challenge, and the eventual implementation of measures ready for out of phase and during the initial phase may cause another to apply.
Yesterday
From the economic point of view, the collapse of some financial markets overexposed to risk has turned into a global economic crisis that will be followed, it seems, of a recession (for 2009, the OECD projected a decrease in average GDP growth of 4.3%) member countries. On the merits, the origin of the current crisis are the shortcomings of the banking and monetary systems: a long period of low rates of interest worldwide, supported by expansionary monetary policies, imbalances of the current-account balances and economic growth through light supraalimentata money.
Trigger factor-the collapse of real estate loans on the American market, was just weakest, unfortunately the large enough to result in the entire system.
From a psychological point of view, the crisis has been received as a quick replacement of the generally accepted truths about the world by a sudden and massive amount of uncertainty-a wide distortion of General information relevant to the present and especially about the future. For a while, the feeling was that the General image of the world broke into thousands of shards. However, from this point of view, one can say that the crisis has already been surpassed.
Mitigating the negative perception associated uncertainty reflected the first time, but also Western political and media dezmeticirii. Thus, confronted with an avalanche of negative signals on the extension and deepening of the political crisis, the initial reflex was one mongering and disjointed. The first generation of policy measures anticriza was incoherent and improvised, in the absence of a predefined plan for such a situation. Major Western Governments have abandoned overnight 30 years of neoclassical economic policy (summed up, in broad, the Washington Consensus) and also scattered the first hundreds of billions of public dollars into makeshift measures to rescue banks or companies, accompanied by disturbing speeches, have panicked in extreme businesses, accelerating the stockpiling of resources and therefore contracting economic activity at all levels.
There are two categories of causes for this behavior. The first are the nature of the conjuncturala; of these, the most important is the unfortunate overlap of the beginning of the crisis with the American elections. The second category is of systemic nature. By the nature of democracies, political leadership is being provided collectively and competitive. I mean there is a plurality of political voices, none of whom wants to remain lower than the other to express themselves with regard to the developments of this. For this reason, some of the requirements of leadership, as, for example, population linistirii imperative during a crisis are difficult practiced. In addition, another effect of the current political system is inertia. This can become a problem in terms of a criticism of seizures, which were characterized by the sudden change of the situation, causing the political system as in its reactions and interventions to keep up. Will they be synchronous recession and recovery of tomorrow?
Today
In the winter, however, the international system has resumed its work. Anticriza tone began to be picked up by organizations like the IMF, World Bank, EU, various forums which have insisted on the need for international coordination of efforts and have adopted a anticriza speech and conservative internationalist, trying to calm the panic and warning against its temptations and protectionismului threat of inflation caused by irresponsible public spending. In addition to the potential quality of economic policies, international coordination is also an effect of Stilling of economic agents. Minimal-and by comparison with the initial political reactions-it creates the perception that there is an agreement regarding the Township what is happening and what is done. Even if such a deal would be erroneous, in detail, it helps to relieve panic and eliminate some of the uncertainties associated with the crisis, letting reinchegarea an image widely shared enough common they can provide a fixed point required recastigarii control individually and/or its associated sentiment.
These two aspects may be able to avoid two bad ones in the short term. Considering that, on the one hand, most of the major economies are integrated in this institutional framework and that, on the other hand, the main State actors gives it sufficient legitimacy and influence, protectioniste's biases that have started to come in different States can be stopped and kept under control. In addition, the predominance of an international common speech may limit the growing ideological appeal radicalizarii of various movements for which the crisis is a good opportunity to assert any kind of ideas.
Maine
This is what politicians have done and made against the crisis. Paradoxically, however, continuing efforts started perseverance-implementing economic policies prepared as they are designed at the moment-could do more harm than good. In broad, the problem is the following. Both financially and psychologically, the crisis itself seems to have passed. The following phases of the cycle are followed by recession, recovery. Simply, people can not live a long time without any economic activity. But the recovery processes are in fact synchronous recession; they begin during their subsequent-timing is just a simplification to facilitate understanding. Therefore, the main danger is that the collateral effects of the policies, which follow a anticriza rate independent of that of the crisis should not hurt the recovery of natural economy.
The mix of economic policies employed against the crisis involves, on the one hand, a monetary policy consisting in loss of interest rates and monetary expansion ("quantitative" in current terminology easening) and, on the other hand, a fiscal policy consisting in "fiscal stimulus": high government expenditure and lowering taxation (or at least maintain its previous level); the budgetary deficit designed just to be financed by increasing the money supply (via buying by central banks bills). Government spending, in theory, would be directed towards three aims: cleaning of banks and financial institutions with high risk, saving some big companies in an attempt to discontinue the Domino bankruptcies and, finally, investing in public works to fill as many unemployed or unemployed potential. The main idea of this combination of policies is unlocking the economic activity through lower commodity prices. Some estimates, monetary growth resulting from the crisis has already passed $ 4 triliarde (for comparison, the value of the OECD trade in goods and services in 2000 was approximately 6 trd), money that will be followed in the short term an additional 1.1 trd injected via the IMF, World Bank and other regional banks. Obviously, the cost of all operations is all the coins such as "usurate", paid by all owners of these coins. Bet can be successful only if two conditions are met: 1. Shot of the currency must take place during the crisis, and not during a recession or recovery. Synchronizing with a blocking phase of the crisis is essential. And 2. For the desired effect, dispersion of new currency into the economy should be quick, sharp.
If perception according to which part of the crisis cycle is completed is correct, then the window of opportunity for this Mix of policies will close as soon as possible. Their continuation during the recession would not only slow the recovery, which consists in redirecting economic activities of individuals (and, implicitly, a combination of other factors of production) in new directions or areas that are potentially profitable. But if they are injured by incercarea inflation, on the one hand, and of new and changing regulations, on the other hand, will fail.
A completely different set of policies is needed in anticipation of economic recovery, and the difficulty of changing the political options so that they keep up with the crisis is the most worrying thing.
This set of three postcriza policy entails. First, the mix of economic policies must return to reglarile. The aim of monetary policy must be control of inflation, by stopping the "quantitative easening ' and limiting the intervention to fine adjustment of the reference interest. Rebuilding confidence in the currency is the key to that economic activities can be resumed. Second is the issue of regulating. The commotion caused by the crisis has raised a wave of opinion, not always disinterested in favor of settlement growth. Fortunately, unlike economic mix that was not described, could be done overnight. But now it would be necessary to change the switch as a contraintuitiva at national level opinions and experts, so that the recovery is required precisely the liberalisation and deregulation of markets, so that their volatility to surge as much as possible to allow for readjustment of economic activity as soon as the crisis passes the minimum point. Finally, the third element involves direct assistance to individuals or families most severely hit by the crisis (and not via the economic units in which they are now employees, among which market you should select the viable).
By facilitating communication and information flow among other globalization effects speeding up economic and psychological reactions in relation to changes. This is a serious reason to believe that the performance of the current negative economic cycle can be one. The worst case is the one in which the insistent anticriza policies inappropriate could cause inflation, thus preventing hardening of the market recovery and prolonging the recession. That happened after the last big Crisis.
