In Romania there are currently two Governments: the Government itself and the unity which can be considered a Government to the President.
The Supreme Council of Defense of the country is composed of the President of Romania (which is also the President of CSAT), Prime Minister (as Vice President), Foreign Minister, Interior Minister, Minister of Defense, Minister of Justice, Minister of industries and Finance Minister, SRI and SIE directors, Chief of the General staff and the President's Adviser on national security issues.
As you can see, no less than six Ministers belong to the CSAT. The problem is that, according to the law, the Government is subordinated to CSAT. Thus, under article 3 of the law 415 in 2002 (law that regulates the activity of CSAT) Council resolutions "are mandatory for central public administration authorities and public institutions referred to".
Very simply put, things are kinda like this: currently, there are two Government and executive powers: CSAT. The Government is subordinated to the UNITY, and the latter is not responsible, in fact, in front of anyone. Formally, the Council is controlled by the Parliament, but the control is exercised only by examining the activity reports of the CSAT.
This institutional architecture is debatable, whether Romania would be a presidential Republic, parliamentary or presidential. The existence of the second executive power is a source of potential institutional conflicts, even if one of the other powers formally subordinated to it. For example, the Minister of Defense, justice or Foreign Minister, is subordinate to both the Prime Minister and the President, and this generates confusion. And the fact that the CSAT, as Executive power, is not a real Parliament subordinate to generate still more problems.
A more coherent institutional arrangement existed in Romania in the interwar period, when the work of the Council for the defense of the country (the "grandfather" of the current CSAT). The Council was composed of the Prime Minister (President of the Council of Ministers), as heir to the throne, President (when it reached), of several Ministers (Foreign Minister of Interior, of, of, of interested Finance of public works, Commerce and industries, of communications, of agriculture and of public health) and a representative of the Supreme Council of Ostirii (the latter having only a consultative vote).
The Council's conclusions were becoming not ruling unless they were confirmed by the Government (Council of Ministers, as it was called then), what looks like, in an unequivocal manner, the Council was directly subordinate to the Government. It is true that the King had the right to convene a meeting of the Council at any time of the Defense of the country, as well as to take part in any meeting of the Council (in which case having the quality of its President), but this does not mean that the CSAT had a double-hatted, because in this case the Council's conclusions were becoming not ruling unless they were voted in one session. Therefore, whoever presided over meetings of the old Council was subordinated to unity without quibble only Government.
Things were so very clear: CSAT was subordinate to the Government which, in turn, was subordinated to Parliament. in this way does not appear no problem double Executive.
However, there are politicians and commentators who, perhaps ignorantly, argue that the current CSAT wouldn't be a descendant of the old Council indirectly of the Defense of the country, but of the Crown. But the Council of the Crown was an advisory body which does not have any of the old powers or the current CSAT. It was made up of former Prime Ministers, heads of important parties, personalities of the public life and Government Ministers, and was meant to provide advice to the King whenever he deems necessary. Furthermore, in March 1938, when it was institutional decree-law by Charles II, the Crown was an informal structure. In other words, between the Crown and the Council for UNITY, there is even the slightest touch.
We have therefore two situations: one in which there is only one executive power reporting to Parliament and the other (the one in the present) in which we have two executive powers of which only one (the Government) is subordinated to Parliament, and the other (CSAT). Furthermore, the Government is at present altogether unusual. He reports to both the Parliament (which is perfectly normal in a democracy) and CSAT (what is abnormal and very undemocratic).
The truth is that the current institutional structure is inherited from the former Communist regime. The Supreme Council of Defense of the country is an institution which derive directly from the Defense Council, whose resolutions RSR were, under the law, binding on the Government, as well as resolutions of the current CSAT. And, like today, the head of State was the President of the Council. Therefore, the problem arises from a double Executive Communist period. Naturally, as she was then, but it irelevana has become very relevant and annoying when the Parliament and the Government have become genuine institutions, along with the introduction of parliamentary democracy.
If we are really firm and consistent in the condemnation of communism, I think you need to inlaturam and institutional deficiencies that we've inherited from the period of the Communist regime. This even more so as, in a parliamentary democracy, the existence of the double Executive leading problems inevitably generate conflict between institutions. And this leads to a malfunction of the rule of law.
