Our customary state of us lie, deceive us, incapacitate, and charge ten times for the same thing. Public expenditure are indecent and the laws came to be after any standard could not be respected. Many words but empty, mazgalituri noima applied arbitrarily and violated daily. Too many to ever know, too demanding and too boasts that its merits you beat your head.
Indeed, the more corrupt a country is, the more numerous are his laws. When it breaks, the machine haraie awful: it increases the volume of the VAT legislation and alert, issued public messages on a daily basis are in excess, and the image becomes the main concern of public institutions. It is the natural reaction of the system to carpi, most visible drawbacks when substantive issues remain untouched.
To be able to reach the merits, should, on the one hand, to ignore this noise and hear only and solely your own consciousness and reasons. In addition, you must get out from minoratul is worn on politics and political discussion, avoiding to seek authorities to tell us what we have to do, without having to leave us impressed with official views, and beyond the superficial comparisons between how it is in America, France, Germany, Sweden or where-thus giving us a low chance to get out of the "fork" of Maiorescu.
Next exercise we could help in both directions: Let's say all of us, citizens, taxpayers, sovereign-we arrive at the conclusion that it can no longer be and we organize so that, as of 1 January 2009, to enter all in "tax strike"-that is, we pay more taxes. None. No State can punish us all and message conveyed through the elegant civic disobedience is that, due to non-fulfillment of the obligations, citizens have decided in their sovereignty, that his services are no longer required, and that, thus, the State is fired in corpore-together with the political system and a public system, with all its organs, legitimate or illegitimate, "irreplaceable" or not. Strictly business!
This thought experiment places us in what is called "meta-constitutional situation". in this situation we have negotiated a new social contract. between us. Professional, calm, like I want to hire a security guard in the village. We must ensure that the following security guard whom we hire is our puppy, good mannered and obedient, so that it can bring out the beauty contest at the Park, and the monstruletul degenerate today remain only an ugly memory. We cannot hope that all problems will be solved completely, but we can definitely reach a million kilometres away from numbness in who we are today.
A watchman, the only armed in the village, may commit two types of errors. first of all, can we not defend properly-not to provide services in a timely manner for which he is employed. I say "system error of type I '. Secondly, i would be able to pass through the head as it is profitable to defend us, "too much": abusing us, such dangers and exagerand becoming more arogandu, and increasingly more tasks and then pretending charges increasingly higher-"system error of type II". The two types of errors on the other one draws. If we manage to avoid both long-term errors, calls as I did.
The first kind of error-the problem of efficiency-it's avoidable starting from the horizontal separation (legislative, Executive, judicial) and vertical (local, regional, central) of power in the State through strict tracking of two principles: the principle according to which a problem has to be solved at the lowest level at which it can be solved, namely the principle of reducing the "democratic way"-input-output relationship of the citizens , politicians and policy. At this "lowest possible level" jonctioneaza best interests with the best knowledge. Administrative decentralization as surrogates or developing regions can not cope with the pressures of interlocking system: the constitutional allocation of authority issues tend to migrate upwards on the hierarchies … To be coherent, solid and vertical separation of power must be doubled with the reorganization, symmetrical, the tax system: fees should be collected locally and regionally and then allocated a proportion towards the central level, and not vice versa (because otherwise, funds are allocated at the Center on political criteria).
The second type of error-"who keeps the guard"-is really difficult. È ' i though, there are solutions of feel-good.
In terms of taxation, the principle is that people cannot be charged without agreeing to be charged. To be able to agree to be charged, they must know clearly how much will be charged. Therefore, in the Constitution must be spelled out three clauses: 1. A certain level of taxation, fixed (which may be amended only in truly extraordinary circumstances) 2. Removing any sneaky fees or implied and 3. prohibition of any deficit spending. In addition to its intrinsic immorality, any expense in deficit means charging illegitimate to future generations; in fact, this rule is already in force in the case of the EU budget.
Regarding the arogarea of responsibilities through hiperreglementare, the Constitution must provide conditions of legitimacy for law-making (summarized by r. Barnett in his latest book). All subsequent laws with the Constitution must be necessary to protect the rights of others and 2. All subsequent laws the Constitution must be relevant in the sense that it doubles. they don't violate pre-existing rights of those on which they are imposed and b. each law contains the less restrictive version of the regulatory options.
These are some of the tools needed for the constitutional system and the political system struni. in their absence, State interests are: to be bigger, more powerful, to take charge as big, to provide as little towards end users, to depend on as many things about him, and not be never asked what he did with the money. the interests of the public, on the other hand, are: to obtain a minimum price-quality ratio in public goods supplied (defense, justice, education, etc), to have a great more freedom of choice, and to be more low prices-neumflate fees, restrictions and administrative costs.