In parallel with the constitutional project, Center for analysis and institutional development (CADI) initiated for several months and a public debate about the relationship between liberty and security. In December, along with the magazine, a supplement to the CADI published the journal in which the dignitaries, members of the academic world and civil society also exposed their point of view in this matter.
Front lines respond to both concerns. It may seem curious to ask the question of intelligence services in a debate about the Constitution. But, if by "Constitution" we understand rather a constitutional architecture, a way to reflect on the place of each public institutions and powers of each into a unified and coherent whole designed to guarantee freedom of the individual and citizen rights, things gets respect. When we talk about "control over the intelligence services, should, I think, to understand that phrase, control over the budget of the respective services (also on budgetary execution) and, at the same time, the control over the legality of their actions. In this second sense, we must have in mind not only the actions of the intelligence services are held in compliance with the laws in force, but if they respect the fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens in the service which operates these services.
There is an opinion, supported primarily by the authorities, according to which, since we are in a State of war-at "terrorism"-citizen rights and freedoms must be limited (sometimes even severe, as it happens in the United States, since the law went into effect called an irony-perhaps involuntary-Patriot Act). I don't want to discuss here whether this opinion is justified or not. I think, however, that, if, for various reasons, it comes down to limiting certain rights and freedoms, this should be offset by an even more rigorous control over the intelligence services. Otherwise, do nothing but pavam road to tyranny.
Own information services, by the very nature of their business, a power that is potentially dangerous for both citizens and institutions, the rule of law. As a result, limiting this power (by setting aside, as much as possible, the size of her malignant) represents an obligation for anyone take seriously liberal values.
To note, however, that the services aren't the only institutions with malignant potential over an order of liberty. The Government itself has exactly the same potential, as sometimes even the Parliament (through the power to issue laws alter the constitutional framework). In the case of the Parliament, the solution found was the establishment of a Constitutional Court; in the case of the Government, the solution was a parliamentary regime, in which executive power is subordinated to the 10th power, legislative and the judiciary is independent. We can find similar solutions and services?
I think Yes. They are even suggested parliamentary regime. First of all, how in such a system, the Executive is subordinate to the legislature, putting the intelligence services under the authority of the Government would strengthen parliamentary control over them. I think, however, that these services should not be placed under the authority of the Prime Minister, but rather under the Ministry of the Interior. Probably the best solution in this respect would be the establishment of a post of Secretary of State in the Ministry of Internal Affairs to answer the two main information services (in the case of Romania, SRI and SIE).
In this way, the Executive would have a double control over those services. On the one hand, there would be direct control that Interior Minister exerted their il. On the other hand, the Prime Minister would be exercising indirectly in that the Interior Minister is subordinate. At the same time, the legislature would have, in turn, a double control over the intelligence services. Control exercised by specialized committees, i would add that Parliament exerted. il A Government which exercises powers of control over the stupid two services may be threatened with a motion of censure. On the other hand, Interior Minister responds to himself, directly in front of the Parliament. He's risking a motion simple if not properly exercised authority over the intelligence services.
In addition, we should not forget that the Ministers are politicians, and that the Prime Minister is, as a rule, the head of the party that won the most seats in the Parliament (although there are cases of coalitions in which the head of the smaller party becomes the Prime Minister, thus ensuring that party or not is "dispensabil"). In these circumstances, direct responsibility in front of the Parliament (the indirect, his own party and its electorate) oblige the Government to exercise a virtually smooth authority over the intelligence services-and, in addition, to pay greater attention to the rights and liberties of its citizens. From this point of view, it's worth it to see that, under the same constraints "war against terrorism", British parliamentary regime introduced more modest limits in exercising their rights and liberties than citizens ' semiprezidential scheme from United States.
Finally, perhaps, after the British model, would merit consideration taken into a court and the establishment of jurisdiction only possible abuses committed by the authorities against ordinary citizens information, companies and even State institutions. The Court will have power to turn a double control over the services concerned: one directly through the Court, and one indirectly through the Constitutional Court. Therefore, each of the three powers of the State will exercise its own control over the two services.
