The coherence of the different constitutional choices to be made cannot be provided than by taking explicit criteria to guide them. One of these appears to be critical in terms of freedom, namely, the right of which the construction logic of the constitutional architecture is from the bottom up-from the State citizen, from individual political entities to the composites. Application consistency would be likely to provide both local and regional autoguvernarii premises, as well as correspondence between the Constitution and the values, norms and informal behaviors generically "political culture".
In the case of Romania's question: what exactly can be found locally to be able to reconstruct the entity wider policy? And, in particular, is needed to replace the counties with regions?
The local level is the great loser of the inertia of the centralized State administrative tradition. On the one hand, its functioning is constrained by a number of bureaucratic rules and inadequate legislative in nature (as well as the initially imposed precondition of operation centralized model), and, on the other hand, most of the budgetary resources coming from redistributia through the fiscal system resulted and centralized budget. For the local level to function as a true policy entity it is necessary that the rigidity of such rules to be replaced via liberties of self-government (supported by a corresponding tax system). It is neither necessary nor desirable to have local administrative uniformity throughout Romania, but, on the contrary, institutional diversity and competition should be encouraged.
If until today the Constitution does not provide for political entities of local institutional prerequisites autoguvernarii, incorsetand basically individual energies of democratic involvement, how it should be done in order to reverse the negative effect? Desueta function has uniform regulations can be added through the strengthening of direct democracy: frequent use of local referenda and the imposition of local councils wide (with free participation and regular basis to community members). This change would be likely to apply effectively the principle of subsidiarity and, besides, it can stimulate the associativity of the main school of democratic political culture.
At the first level, the discussion concerning the composite option between preservation and their replacement with counties (possibly cut on current development regions) should be preceded by two observations. The first is that the asymmetry of power and resources between the centralized State and regional-level given that the whole company was poor-it was mitigated by economic development in recent years; Some even say that was reversed. The second is a determination of decentralization of administrative failure process still supported by reformistii of public administration, in the absence of anything better.
From the very beginning, eliminating the possibility of coexistence with counties and regions (which would imply an unacceptable level of bureaucracy), there are two arguments-except those concerning the economies of scale that could be made-which in favor of replacing pleads counties by regions.
Most importantly derives from the observation of the operation of the "local barons" phenomenon visible especially in recent years. The idea is that an administrative unit the size of a county is easily captured by an individual or a small group of interest. Such a monopolizeaza actor primarily administrative and political relationship between a county and central-level resource that, in the current system, controls the most valuable opportunities. Expanding the space game, these actors are put in competition, and the system becomes much more difficult to capture.
By the same reasoning, the associative structures of citizens (and especially those who have or seek to have a political impact public times) may not become relevant players than considering that their development space is wide enough. In addition, by expanding the opportunities and diversity increases intermediate combination.

For these reasons, we will face a set of issues at a practical level, due to constitutional reform and concurrency of creating the necessary preconditions for institutional autoguvernarii. For instance, while granting freedom of self-government of communes and towns is easy, the same thing can be said about replacing the counties with regions: in a first phase, the regions will be deprived of representation politics in relation to counties, which will seek to defend their current status. In these circumstances, the most likely option is ruled out from the start just as unacceptable: survival and introducing a layer of extra regional bureaucracy.