What does a liberal from a Constitution? Question finds an answer immediately: freedom. The Constitution sets out the limits of State action, and defenders of freedom want these limits to be more restrained. Besides the actual limits over which the State cannot pass (so-called rights of citizens), the constitutions of liberal democracies and provide a mechanism to ensure compliance with these limits: an intricate web of responsibilities and roles of mutual surveillance and control for the main institutions of the State (in other words, separation and balance of powers in the State).
At first glance, and architects of our Constitution seem to have understood the demands of liberal when they made one step further, Dividing the Executive power between the President and the premier, putting them at the disposal of the first kind of miniature Government (CSAT) Executive control over the secret services and skills in the field of the appointment of members of the Government. It is said that fear of a possible drift toward authoritarianism prompted the authors of the Constitution to establish this "two-headed Executive", as it came to be named in public debates.
Not at all paradoxically, this peculiarity of our Constitution enjoys popularity in some liberal circles (indeed, I use the word "liberal" to refer to a person with liberal convictions, not a party member). Indeed, a weak Executive, paralyzed by a logic of conflict permanently, in seeming unable to increase their power in civil damages and, in conclusion, it should be preferred for any liberal who comply. Arata, formulated a terse, two-headed Executive defense from the perspective of accounting.
The argument deserves more broadly formulated: in an Executive consisting of two centres of power in the conflict, the costs that you incur that governors to exercise power are larger, and thus the costs they will incur hindered us our freedom will be higher. It's enough to think of Reed dispute the appointments of some Ministers to defend us with extra clarity on who must submit to Governors enforce political programme. Therefore, the conflict hinder exercise of power and thus defend freedom. This argument is undoubtedly seductive, because it opposes the prejudecatii widely Shared, that the obstacles in the way of exercising power are obstacles in the way of the future, not protecting freedom of the ramparts.
And yet, the argument has two vulnerabilities. On the one hand, it does not take into account the particular circumstances of Romania, which doesn't have to be an Executive, which paralysed her booty an inert bureaucracy, coupled with atavica legislation, but an Executive able to restructure the State apparatus from inherited from the Communist State. In other words, we find ourselves in the paradoxical situation of seemingly inescapable and to entrust the task of State we get rid of the State. On the other hand, the argument starts from the false premise that the existence of two centres of power in the conflict permanently decreases the total amount of exercise executive power, because exercising power costs grow evenly. However, the powers of the Executive power centres do not overlap completely. Therefore, they are not forced to dispute all actions that make up the exercise of power. Specifically, the Executive does not Impede at all bicefalitatea the Government to issue emergency ordinances of Fatima and distribute the money from the budget after a inavuabil algorithm, does it Prevent any President to convene CSAT whenever he wants to score electoral points, or directing the activities of secret services transparently and with competent police secret. Moreover, besides the fact that fails to censure the abusive exercise of quasi-judicial power, the competition between the two centres of power Executive appears to have as a result of the effort of every pervert parts to increase institutional resources within, just for the purpose of winning the political battle. So, here's how the competition from your own executive power leads to restriction of freedom, by increasing the power of the State in areas controlled exclusively by each centre of power, and not to safeguard religious freedom by impairing the exercise executive power.
What remains, then, to do? How can I ensure effective governance in the direction of rule of law? A solution would be replacing the constitutional architecture of the eccentric with a constitutional architecture that will be traditional already passed the test of effectiveness in relation to the goals. Such a Constitution would move the focus on finding innovative approaches to institutional control each other on narrow indication and clearer to the attributions of the different institutions of the State, in the context of a classic model of separation of powers.