* Originally Published in revista 22 collection ' a Constitution for liberty III '

The thesis of this article is that the selection of members of Parliament and local councilors vote e, for reasons which issues will become clear during the proceedings, and that a radical solution to the problems democracy is returning to a representative model of democracy based on the draw of the representatives, both at central level and at the local level. But given their confidence in the ability of the (naive) vote to select representatives capable and well intentioned and skepticism (realistically) in front of the radical proposals, trying to convince people to quit courting lawmakers held the draw does not seem to have a chance of winning, and with good reason: the radical reforms must be regarded with a dose of skepticism that you advertise any leap into the unknown.

There is a way to moderate certain radical reforms, namely low-scale experimentation, and advocate for reform that correspond to this type of testing. Radicalism they may be tempered by the method mentioned, reducing the scale of application of both vertical (choosing instead to the supreme legislative body a local representative body), and horizontal (limiting the change to a single administrative subdivision). In practice, this revision of the Constitution would entail amendment of Art. 121 paragraph 2. 1 and para. 122 2, which provide the selection by vote of local councilors and County, so as to leave to the discretion of the legislature fixing modality of selection of Councillors, with the possibility to choose an administrative subdivision (commune) to the selection system be tested through drawing lots.

Let's see, therefore, how would such a system looks like in practice and what would be the consequences of applying his. At present, citizens have the right to choose their representatives and be elected in local councils on party lists or as independents. What would change if the elections would be replaced with random selection of advisers? A plausible hypothesis is that the first would change the quality of the House of representatives. Without a preselection inside parties and without an election campaign during which candidates take contact with the voters, it seems obvious that in the future the Council will sneak people completely nepregatite for your decisions on membership in an organization of local public administration (even if the draw is made on the voter rolls, thus excluding people with serious psychiatric problems the loss of rights, electoral inmates or minors).

This hypothesis is based on unreliable but two presuppositions.: 1) the intake inside the parties to preserve nature e in election race only competent individuals, able to solve problems of local administration and 2) performance from candidates ' campaign helps citizens to eliminate candidates from the race's moral or intellectual profile improperly. In reality, however, allow parties access to candidates on the list depending on the resources which they put at the disposal of the party for the campaign, not according to their potential for good stewards of local affairs, and the choice of candidates on lists eliminates the need to appear in front of voters asking them to vote in person. In addition, do not forget that we have in mind an experiment at the local level. Our Board members will get to know the problems of the village due to the mere fact that live there.

How corrupt would be but new local representatives, selected randomly, in comparison with the business? The answer to this question depends on the way you explain corruption.

If it is true that you affirm corruption mentality, how many Romanian intellectuals, then replace the vote with the draw does not solve the problem of corruption of local representatives elected by the citizens: share the same mentality. Replace with nothing even though the citizens take at random, will behave the same.

But if it's corruption encouraged by certain elements of the situation in which one is found (for example, pressure to recover the money spent in the campaign, the likelihood of being caught if masluiesti auctions, belonging to a network of potential mituitori-businessmen who financed his campaign and will recover the investment), as support specialists in political science, then giving up the vote serves to eradicate corruption just as elections themselves give birth situation creionate more up. However, because I assume the election campaign, they are expensive, and the number of people willing to finance free candidates e smaller than you might think, the inevitable conclusion is that the selection of representatives by voting encourages corruption.

So here's why selection by drawing of lots e superior vote: since, ceteris paribus, make corruption more difficult, eliminating the perverse incentives that make the representatives to serve special interests. The pressure subsides to recover money invested in the campaign and disappears with the potential relationship mituitor, former sponsor of the campaign.

Euphemistically speaking, it's unlikely that reform described above to make room in the new Constitution. Article to serve less as proposal for reform and more as a vehicle for the dissemination of methods of management of public affairs which he enjoyed in ancient times of successful enough to not merit the oblivion.