Can we get evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) from repeatedly apply the prisoner’s dilemma (PD) within a population? Axelrod says so, provided we introduce a penalty strategy for those who fail to punish defectors (breaking of norms/ non-cooperation). Boyd and Lorberbaum disagree and say that the tit for tat strategy is easily reversible (makes the transition from cooperation to non-cooperation smoother) and so unstable in real life situations. Skyrms asserts that theoretically it is possible as long as ESS is adaptively acknowledged. Don’t be disheartened by the maths behind it; the idea is that stable evolutionary situations can emerge in order to automatically block a population is a self-imposed cooperation situation. (Laurentiu Gheorghe presents)

To read: Axelrod 1986 – An Evolutionary Approach to Norms

Optional: Boyd and Lorberbaum 1987 – No Pure Strategy is ESS in Repeated PDs

Skyrms 1994 – Darwin Meets the Logic of Decision Correlation in Evolutionary Game Theory