R Castillo-Constitution (Nov. 23, minimal. 2010)

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* Originally Published in revista 22 collection ' a Constitution for liberty III '

 

When lack of respect for constitutional rules brings us to the peak, we say just indignation about the Constitution as it existed "only on paper". But observe with naduf as elsewhere are a constant guide constitutions in public life and are even worshipped, such as the famous American Constitution. There is even at least one country, the United Kingdom, where there seems to have been a need for a provision to be called so, but where the rule of law implies that there is a constitutional framework far more solid than the us.

 

The two examples mentioned above suggest that a Constitution is defined both by text and a whole tradition of political actors, representatives of the State and citizens ' of these provisions. A Constitution which is supported such a tradition is a Constitution that "works", I mean accomplishes its role as guarantor of asset rules and fundamental rights.

 

Our constitutional tradition was reintemeiata in 1991, after the change of regime. Twenty years is a short time in the life of a Constitution. However, it might be the case to change. Given the conditions in which it was conceived and passed, it may just a lefty, transition. Until now, the most fierce debates have been waged about the political institutions and the configuration to the ratio between the powers. Important topics, no doubt. However, it is worth remembering that, in practice, these configurations, different from country to country, are usually the result of a historical compromise between the political actors, and not of an infallible formula. Experience in countries with solid constitutional-democratic regimes show us that stability is obtained: in the moment, they are hotly contested. Once adopted, are accepted from major political forces. In the next period, the rules are changed only marginally, by slow procedures and lengthy debates. The lesson seems to be that, in a powerful constitutional regime political actors adapt to the rules, and not vice versa.

 

It is likely that the deficiencies established power architecture in 1991 to be too large and the edifice stand to crash over us, though this remains to be debated. About the constitutional architecture of the rights discussed but quite a bit. In fact, there are constitutional rights because we believe that certain rights are above others, that is too important for them to abandon the legislative process caused by political disputes. How do we decide what are these rights? I could make a list with all the rights that every citizen could be considered as fundamental. The disadvantage of this procedure is that we wake up with inflation, many of them contradictory, many who would not be accepted as such by the majority. The political process would be slowed down over extent with the great danger that, in practice, constitutional rights remain "on paper", to be the current broken. Just as happens with the currency, inflation and at devaluation lead here.

 

We are dealing with an inflation of rights in the Constitution of Romania? I was surprised to see how little alarmata was the public opinion of the Government's decision to invoke the privilege, last summer to restrict constitutional rights in the name of constitutional democratic regime (article salvgardarii. 53). In argumentatia, the Romanian Government hangs the fate of democracy, no more and no less, than the agreement with the IMF. The Constitutional Court agreed. If only that it's enough to make us give up the constitutional guarantees, it means that we do not in fact constitutional guarantees. As the authors of the Constitution believed that exercising fundamental rights could endanger the stability of the regime in times of peace tells us something fundamental about how they really are.

 

The Government has resorted to this artifice dangerous because there's other constitutional provisions which it cut fur hindered them pensions and salaries of budgetary employees. It's all about Art. 41, which guarantees the right to work, which, in constitutional jurisprudence, including the right to all the salary.

 

I think we can agree that it's absurd for the Government to be hindered by the Constitution to take austerity measures, whatever you believe about the current policies. It would be more reasonable, in this case, we give up on both articles which transfer what is supposed to be subject to political confrontations in a constitutional dispute? Instead we wonder which are the rights that we want to see them mentioned in the Constitution, to ask better which are rights that we cannot abandon without giving up democracy and rule of law. It might be a more useful guide for constitutional reform, which ensures a broad agreement on fundamental rights and to simplify the newly instated the rights (and derogarilor) Constitutional Court.

 

Paradoxically, a reliable and effective Constitution is a Constitution which aims to guarantee some rights, but rights that all citizens, in power or in opposition, rich or poor, you know and we consider fundamental. These rights could truly be regarded as public opinion key vault of a democratic regime, and to guarantee their permanent as a crucial issue.